Accessibility links Skip to main content Keyboard shortcuts for audio player Open Navigation Menu --> Newsletters NPR Shop Get NPR+ Close Navigation Menu Home News Expand/collapse submenu for News National World Politics Business Health Science Climate Race Culture Expand/collapse submenu for Culture Books Movies Television Pop Culture Food Art & Design Performing Arts Life Kit Gaming Music Expand/collapse submenu for Music Tiny Desk New Music Friday All Songs Considered Music Features Live Sessions Podcasts & Shows Expand/collapse submenu for Podcasts & Shows Daily Morning Edition Weekend Edition Saturday Weekend Edition Sunday All Things Considered Up First Here & Now NPR Politics Podcast Featured Wait Wait...Don't Tell Me! Fresh Air Wild Card with Rachel Martin It's Been a Minute Embedded Get NPR+ More Podcasts & Shows Search Newsletters NPR Shop Get NPR+ Tiny Desk New Music Friday All Songs Considered Music Features Live Sessions About NPR Diversity Support Careers Press Ethics Why the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear agreement NPR has confirmed a deal that would allow the U.S. to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and allow the country to begin enriching uranium for civilian use. World Why the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear agreement July 22, 20263:58 PM ET Heard on All Things Considered By Patrick Jarenwattananon , Christopher Harland-Dunaway , Juana Summers Why the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear agreement Listen · 5:52 5:52 Transcript Toggle more options Download Embed Embed "> <iframe src="https://www.npr.org/player/embed/nx-s1-5903077/nx-s1-9859231" width="100%" height="290" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" title="NPR embedded audio player"> Transcript NPR has confirmed a deal that would allow the U.S. to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and allow the country to begin enriching uranium for civilian use. Sponsor Message Transcript
JUANA SUMMERS, HOST:
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have signed a nuclear agreement. The U.S. would provide technology for the Saudis to develop a civilian nuclear program. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman once told CBS' "60 Minutes" that his country does not want a nuclear weapon, but if their longtime adversary - Iran - built a bomb, quote, "without a doubt, Saudi Arabia would follow suit." Earlier today, we reached out to Matthew Bunn. He's a former adviser to the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Clinton administration, and he is now a nuclear proliferation expert at Harvard University. Matthew, welcome to the program.
MATTHEW BUNN: Good to be here.
SUMMERS: So just start by telling us if you can, why does Saudi Arabia say it wants a civilian nuclear program?
BUNN: Well, they say that they would like to make nuclear energy to cover their domestic needs so they can export more of their oil and make more money. But they also want to provide the foundation, over time, for having more options to move toward nuclear weapons, should they feel the need.
SUMMERS: And the flip side, then, why would the United States want to provide the kingdom with nuclear technology?
BUNN: Well, the United States, first of all, wants a strong relationship with the kingdom, given its vast oil reserves and role in the global oil market. But, secondly, the United States has nuclear companies that would like the business and would like to see nuclear energy around the world expand to help cope with both energy poverty and climate change.
SUMMERS: And what kinds of rules or safeguards, perhaps, could be put into a deal that would prevent Saudi Arabia from using this technology to develop weapons versus their goal of developing a civilian nuclear program?
BUNN: Well, unfortunately, the Trump administration dropped an insistence on what the United States has been insisting with many countries, that they accept the broader set of international inspections included in what's called the Additional Protocol. Instead, the Trump administration has worked out a bilateral U.S.-Saudi set of inspection arrangements that haven't yet been revealed to the public exactly what they are but apply only to what the U.S. would provide, not to the overall nuclear program in Saudi Arabia.
SUMMERS: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that the U.S. would not sign any deal that would lead to nuclear proliferation. But from what you understand, at this point, are those safeguards included in this deal?
BUNN: So when Secretary Rubio was a senator, he cosponsored legislation that would have required - before any nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia could go into force - that Saudi Arabia confess to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the journalist, and accept the far-reaching inspections called for under what's called the Additional Protocol and accept a ban on both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing - the key technologies you can use to make nuclear weapons material. And Saudi Arabia hasn't agreed to any of that in this deal.
SUMMERS: Well, what happens if Saudi Arabia were to begin working on a weapon in secret? Is there anything that the United States or anyone else could do to stop them?
BUNN: Well, there is a global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons that has been strikingly successful. There's only nine states that have nuclear arms today, and U.S. intelligence and U.S. pressure and U.S. military capabilities have been an important part of that global effort. I think it's very likely that if Saudi Arabia moved in this direction, the United States would have a variety of tools to try to pressure them. But still, agreeing to this kind of an agreement, especially if it does lead to selling Saudi Arabia the uranium enrichment technology that would allow them to make bomb material, does pose some increased risks.
SUMMERS: I mean, we are still learning a lot here, but I wonder how you might expect other countries in the region would react to this news.
BUNN: Well, the reality is Iran already has a uranium enrichment program. That's part of the focus of the ongoing war with Iran, and it's part of the reason why Saudi Arabia wants to have comparable capabilities. So the region is already dealing with Iran's capability. And also, of course, Israel - although it doesn't acknowledge them - has a nuclear weapons capability.
SUMMERS: And in the short term, do you think this could have an impact on the course of the U.S. war with Iran?
BUNN: I think it may make negotiating a reasonable deal with Iran more difficult. If Saudi Arabia isn't agreeing, for example, to the far-reaching international inspections called for in the Additional Protocol, it'll be hard to get Iran to agree to accept those.
SUMMERS: Do you have any sense of the likelihood of the type of support that this agreement would get in Congress, which I believe would have to review it?
BUNN: So the way the deal works under the Atomic Energy Act, it goes to Congress for a review, but if they do nothing, it goes into force. The only way they stop it is if there's a two-thirds majority against it in both Houses of Congress able to override a presidential veto. That seems unlikely.
SUMMERS: We've been speaking with Matthew Bunn of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Thanks so much.
BUNN: Thank you. Copyright © 2026 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information. Accuracy and availability of NPR transcripts may vary. Transcript text may be revised to correct errors or match updates to audio. Audio on npr.org may be edited after its original broadcast or publication. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record. Facebook Flipboard Email Read & Listen Home News Culture Music Podcasts & Shows Connect Newsletters Facebook Instagram Press Public Editor Corrections Transcripts Contact & Help About NPR Overview Diversity NPR Network Accessibility Ethics Finances Get Involved Support Public Radio Sponsor NPR NPR Careers NPR Shop NPR Extra Terms of Use Privacy Your Privacy Choices Text Only Sponsor Message Sponsor Message Become an NPR sponsor (function () { var loadPageJs = function () { (window.webpackJsonp=window.webpackJsonp||[]).push([[22],{310:function(e,n,o){o.p=NPR.serverVars.webpackPublicPath,Promise.all([o.e(1),o.e(2),o.e(3),o.e(4),o.e(80)]).then((e=>{o(15),o(769),o(155),o(176),o(93),o(447),o(254),o(128),o(130),o(754),o(175),o(755),o(255),o(78),o(773)}).bind(null,o)).catch(o.oe)},782:function(e,n,o){e.exports=o(310)}},[[782,0]]]); }; if (document.readyState === 'complete') { loadPageJs(); } else { window.addEventListener('load', function load() { window.removeEventListener('load', load, false); loadPageJs(); }); } })();